Is There a Right to View the Dead at Dover - JB Pictures v. Department of Defense: Limits on the Media\u27s Right to Gather Information by MacNair, Scott A.
Volume 4 Issue 2 Article 7 
1997 
Is There a Right to View the Dead at Dover - JB Pictures v. 
Department of Defense: Limits on the Media's Right to Gather 
Information 
Scott A. MacNair 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj 
 Part of the Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons, and the First Amendment Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Scott A. MacNair, Is There a Right to View the Dead at Dover - JB Pictures v. Department of Defense: 
Limits on the Media's Right to Gather Information, 4 Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports L.J. 387 (1997). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol4/iss2/7 
This Casenote is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal by an authorized 
editor of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. 
IS THERE A RIGHT TO VIEW THE DEAD AT DOVER?
JB PICTURES v. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE: LIMITS
ON THE MEDIA'S RIGHT TO GATHER
INFORMATION
I. INTRODUCTION
An informed society is a necessary ingredient of every democ-
racy.' Realizing this, the framers of the Constitution drafted the
First Amendment which provides that "Congress shall make no law
... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." 2 The press
acts as a check on governmental abuse by providing the public with
information pertaining to governmental decisions.3 The people
can use this information to correct abuses by electing new dele-
gates.4 Therefore, governmental restrictions on speech or the
1. See Frances H. Foster, Information and the Problem of Democracy: The Russian
Experience, 44 Am. J. COMP. L. 243, 247 (1996). Foster discusses the "informed citi-
zenry theory" of democracy which provides that public information acts as a neces-
sary democratic check on the government. See id. This theory recognizes the
essential role that information plays in consolidating and stabilizing a democracy.
See id. Therefore, advocates of this theory hold the media in high esteem for its
collection and dissemination functions. See id. at 248.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
3. See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966). " [T]he press serves and was
designed to serve as a powerful antidote to any abuses of power by governmental
officials and as a constitutionally chosen means for keeping officials elected by the
people responsible to all the people whom they were selected to serve." Id. A free
press serves as another branch of government checking the abuses of power by any
of the established branches. See William T. Coleman, Jr., A Free Press: The Need to
Ensure an Unfettered Check on Democratic Government Between Elections, 59 TUL. L. REv.
243, 244 (1984).
4. See Coleman, supra note 3, at 244. A democracy depends on periodic elec-
tions for its survival. See id. The press provides the electorate with the information
needed to make educated decisions concerning the nation's future leadership. See
id. Coleman notes numerous other functions of a free press in a democracy in-
cluding holding governmental institutions accountable to the people and provid-
ing a medium for the discussion of crucial public policy issues. See id.
(387)
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press 5 are a serious concern because such restrictions may allow
abuses to go unrecognized and unchanged. 6
Open access for the press is especially important in times of
war when governmental abuses could potentially lead to the loss of
life. 7 Just prior to Operation Desert Storm, the Department of De-
fense restricted the media's coverage of deceased soldiers at Dover
Air Force Base.8 In JB Pictures v. Department of Defense,9 the District
of Columbia Circuit Court addressed whether it is constitutional to
restrict the media from covering the arrival of deceased soldiers
5. See Melville B. Nimmer, Introduction - Is Freedom of the Press a Redundancy:
What Does It Add to Freedom of Speech?, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 639, 653 (1975), reprinted in,
ERic BARENDT, MEDIA LAW 11, 25 (Eric Barendt ed., 1993) (concluding that it is
possible to differentiate between freedom of press and speech based on purposes
of each freedom). Free speech serves the following three functions: (1) the ability
to hear all views and therefore participate intelligently in a democratic society, (2)
self-fulfillment and (3) an alternative to violent acts. See id. Freedom of the press,
like free speech, enables society to participate intelligently in a democracy, but
only provides a limited self-fulfillment function. See id. at 26. Although this dis-
tinction exists, the Supreme Court treats these freedoms as indistinguishable. See
id. at 14.
6. See Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936). Justice Suth-
erland characterized informed public opinion as the most potent restraint on gov-
ernmental abuses and therefore viewed any restriction on a free press with grave
concern. See id.
Similarly, Justice Holmes expressed the marketplace of ideas theory which
suggests "that the ultimate good.., is ... reached by free trade in ideas." Abrams
v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919). This theory recognizes that restraints
on speech are not necessary because the marketplace will naturally eliminate ex-
pression that the majority disagrees with. See id.
7. See Michelle D. Boydston, Comment, Press Censorship and Access Restrictions
During the Persian Gulf War: A First Amendment Analysis, 25 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1073,
1091 (1992). One of the primary responsibilities of the press is "to prevent any
part of the government from deceiving the people and sending them off to distant
lands to die of foreign fevers and foreign shot and shell." Id.; see also Michelle
Tulane Mensore, Note, The First Amendment Fights Back: A Proposal for the Media to
Reclaim the Battlefield After the Persian Gulf War, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1145, 1181-
82 (1992) (discussing media's conflict with Department of Defense during Persian
Gulf War and noting likelihood of detrimental consequences if public remains
ignorant because of military deception or restrictions); Michael W. Klein, The Cen-
sor's Red Flair, the Bombs Bursting in Air: The Constitutionality of the Desert Storm Media
Restrictions, 19 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 1037, 1075 (1992) (stating "[when the gov-
ernment decides to commit its troops to war, the significance of the press as a
source of information intensifies"); Mark C. Rahdert, The First Amendment and Me-
dia Rights During Wartime: Some Thoughts After Operation Desert Storm, 36 VILL. L. REv.
1513, 1540 (1991) (describing compelling public interest in information during
war time in order to maintain democratic control).
8. See U.S. DEPT. OF DEFENSE, PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE-OPERATION DESERT
STORM CASUALTY AND MORTUARY AFFAIRS 3, Joint Appendix ("J.A.") 123 (Feb. 7,
1991). For a specific discussion of the Department of Defense policy, see infra
notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
9. 86 F.3d 236 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
[Vol. 4: p. 387
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during or following a war.10 The government argued that un-
restricted press access would infringe on privacy interests of the de-
ceased's family.11 The media countered that restricted coverage
would result in a one-sided perception of the war, allowing the pub-
lic to see the healthy soldiers leaving for war but not those re-
turning in caskets. 12
This Note examines the holding and rationale provided by the
court inJB Pictures as well as the implications for the media's access
to Dover Air Force Base and other governmentally restricted areas.
The first section of this Note details the facts of JB Pictures.'3 Next,
this Note provides an overview of the media's right of access in vari-
ous situations. 14 This Note then explains the D.C. Circuit Court's
rationale supporting its holding inJB Pictures.15 The fourth section
analyzes the court's reasoning providing a critique based on prior
holdings and additional authority.1 6 Finally, this Note examines
the likely consequences of the court's holding in _B Pictures.17
II. FACTS
Prior to Operation Desert Storm, soldiers killed abroad were
brought to Dover Air Force Base (Dover) where they were prepared
10. Id. While courts have addressed a right of access issue with respect to
military bases, this issue historically arose in the context of freedom of speech
rather than the right to gather information. For a discussion of cases dealing with
the press's right of access to military bases for freedom of speech purposes, see
infra notes 123-27 and accompanying text.
11. SeeJB Pictures, 86 F.3d at 241. The government argued that bereaved fami-
lies may not want media coverage of the arrival of caskets at Dover and that if
ceremonies were held at Dover, families and friends would experience a burden by
feeling compelled to travel to Dover to attend the ceremonies. See id. For a fur-
ther discussion of these arguments and the D.C. Circuit's analysis of them, see infra
notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
12. See JB Pictures, 86 F.3d at 241. JB Pictures and other plaintiffs claimed that
this restriction on the media led to "viewpoint discrimination" because the media
was allowed to cover the supplies and soldiers leaving for war, but not the deceased
returning thereby giving the public a false sense of security that everything associ-
ated with the war was positive. See id. at 238. For further discussion of viewpoint
discrimination, see infra notes 128-33 and accompanying text.
13. For a discussion of the facts and procedural background of JB Pictures, see
infra notes 18-25 and accompanying text.
14. For an analysis of prior cases dealing with the press's right of access, see
infra notes 26-133 and accompanying text.
15. For an examination of the D.C. Circuit Court's reasoning in JB Pictures,
see infra notes 134-68 and accompanying text.
16. For a critical analysis of the court's holding and rationale in JB Pictures, see
infra notes 169-92 and accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of the potential consequences of this decision, see infra
notes 193-94 and accompanying text.
1997] 389
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for burial.1 8 Ceremonies, open to the public and press, took place
at Dover upon the arrival of the deceased soldiers. 19 The Depart-
ment of Defense, however, instituted a policy prior to Desert Storm,
which changed the place of the ceremonies to the service member's
home or duty base. 20 This policy prohibited media coverage of the
deceased at the port of entry but permitted coverage at interim
stops and home stations with the families' consent.21
The Department of Defense did not restrict media access to
other events at Dover thereby allowing the media to continue to
cover outgoing personnel and supplies. 22 JB Pictures and other
plaintiffs23 claimed that the restrictions were unconstitutional be-
cause they constituted impermissible "viewpoint discrimination." 24
The Department of Defense countered that the restriction was con-
stitutional because of the governmental interests it protected.25
18. SeeJB Pictures, 86 F.3d at 238.
19. See id. During the Panama invasion, just two years before Desert Storm,
the public and press attended ceremonies at Dover for soldiers killed in the mili-
tary operation. See Craig Hines, Bush Says Casualties Regrettable but "Worth It", Hous.
CHRON., Dec. 22, 1989, at 1 (reporting landing at Dover of C-141 Starlifter carrying
bodies of four dead sailors and ceremonies that followed).
20. See U.S. DEPT. OF DEFENSE, PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE-OPERATION DESERT
STORM CASUALTY AND MORTUARY AFFAIRS 3, Joint Appendix ("J.A.") 123 (Feb. 7,
1991).
21. See id. During Desert Storm, bodies were still brought to Dover before
being flown to a home or duty base, but the government prohibited press access
whenever bodies were present. SeeJB Pictures v. Department of Defense, 21 Media
L. Rep. 1564, 1565 (D. D.C. 1993).
22. SeeJB Pictures, 86 F.3d at 238. Additionally, the government did not en-
force the restrictions on the media at Dover following Desert Storm for deaths
unrelated to war. See Crash Victims Returned Home 33 Flag-Draped Coffins Arrive from
Croatia, FLA. TODAY, Apr. 7, 1996, at A3 (describing ceremonies held at Dover for
Commerce Secretary Ron Brown and other victims of plane crash); see also Meg
Greenfield, The Long Journey from Mass Graves to Stately Honor Guards, WASH. POST,
Apr. 15, 1996, at A21 (describing televised aspects of ceremonies at Dover for Ron
Brown, Air Force personnel and others who died in plane crash in Croatia).
23. The plaintiffs include journalistic photographers and other news media,
veterans groups and numerous military families. SeeJB Pictures, 21 Media L. Rep. at
1564 n.1.
24. SeeJB Pictures, 86 F.3d at 238. JB Pictures asserted that the government's
restriction on the media's access to deceased soldiers, allows the public to see only
the positive aspects of Operation Desert Storm. See id.
The Veterans for Peace (VFP), also plaintiffs in the suit, raised the argument
that the restrictions deprived them of the freedom to speak because they intended
to "witness" the arrival of the war dead. See id. at 241. The VFP is a non-profit
organization comprised of over 2600 veterans formed for the purpose of abolish-
ing wars. See id. It disseminates information related to the negative aspects of war
and forms relations with pacifists of other nations. See id.
25. See id. The Department of Defense argued that the restriction protected
the privacy interests of the bereaved families and reduced any feeling of compul-
sion to travel to Dover. See id. The Department of Defense also argued that the
[Vol. 4: p. 387
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III. BACKGROUND
The primary issue in JB Pictures was whether the First Amend-
ment accords the public and the media a right of access to de-
ceased soldiers at Dover Air Force Base. 26 The Supreme Court
previously decided cases pertaining to the media's right to gather
information in prisons and criminal proceedings. 2 7 In cases involv-
ing the media's right of access to prisons, the Court utilized a bal-
ancing test, weighing the public's interest in obtaining information
against the government's interest in denying access.28 Alternatively,
when the issue was a right of access to criminal proceedings, the
Court imposed a two prong test.29 The Court found a qualified
First Amendment right of access when: (1) there was a tradition of
openness and (2) access contributed to the functioning of the pro-
cess.3 0 The Court did not clarify which test lower courts should ap-
ply in right of access cases in areas other than prisons and criminal
proceedings. Lacking clear precedent, district courts and circuit
courts have generally applied both tests. 31
A second issue in JB Pictures was whether the media has a right
to be free from governmental restrictions that preclude the report-
case was moot because it was brought after the conclusion of Operation Desert
Storm. See id.
26. Id. at 236.
27. See George E. Seay, III, Comment, Remote Sensing: The Media, the Militay,
and the National Security Establishment-A First Amendment Time Bomb, 59 J. AIR L. &
CoM. 239 (1993) (categorizing right of access cases into two areas: (1) right of
access to prisons and (2) right of access to courtrooms).
28. See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978) (holding media has no
right of access to jails beyond public's right of access); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S.
817 (1974) (holding no right of access for interviewing specific state inmates);
Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974) (following Pell and applying
same holding to federal situation).
29. See Michael J. Hayes, Note, What Ever Happened to "The Right to Know"?:
Access to Government-Controlled Information Since Richmond Newspapers, 73 VA. L.
REv. 1111, 1116-21 (1987) (exploring Supreme Court precedent pertaining to
public's right to know in criminal proceeding context); see also Press-Enter. Co. v.
Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986) (enunciating two prong analysis and holding
right of access extends to preliminary hearings); Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior
Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984) (holding right of access to voir dire portion of criminal
trial); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982) (holding right
of access to criminal trials unless compelling government interest is shown and
narrowly tailored restriction is imposed); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,
448 U.S. 555 (1980) (holding right of access to criminal trials).
30. See Hayes, supra note 29, at 1121. The government can still restrict this
qualified right of access if it shows an overriding interest and if the restriction is
narrowly tailored to execute the interest. See id.
31. For a discussion of lower court decisions applying the balancing test, see
infra notes 95-104 and accompanying text. For a discussion of lower court deci-
sions applying the two prong analysis, see infra notes 88-94 and accompanying text.
1997]
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ing of news in a content-neutral manner.3 2 The Supreme Court
distinguishes between public forums, limited public forums and
nonpublic forums and applies varying levels of scrutiny to test the
constitutionality of speech regulations. 33 In both public forums
and limited public forums, courts reviewing content-based regula-
tions require a compelling interest and narrowly tailored regula-
tions designed to effectuate the compelling interest. 34
Alternatively, for nonpublic forums, courts only require that con-
tent-based restrictions be reasonable.3 5 Discrimination on the basis
of viewpoint, however, is subject to strict scrutiny irrespective of the
forum type.3 6
A. The Right To Gather Information - Supreme Court
Precedent
The Court first addressed the idea of a First Amendment right
to gather information in Zemel v. Rusk.3 7 In Zemel, the Court held
that the First Amendment contains no unqualified right to gather
32. JB Pictures, 86 F.3d at 239. JB Pictures and other plaintiffs alleged that the
Department of Defense's policy abridged their First Amendment right to gather,
report, publish and speak about information pertaining to Operation Desert
Storm. See JB Pictures v. Department of Defense, 21 Media L. Rep. 1564, 1565
(D.C. 1993). Both the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit limited
their analysis to the media's right of access to Dover for purposes of gathering
information. For a discussion of the D.C. Circuit's analysis, see infra notes 134-68
and accompanying text.
33. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46
(1982). For further discussion of these categories of forums and the relevant char-
acteristics of each, see infra notes 105-33 and accompanying text.
34. See id. See generally, Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First
Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 189 (1983) (discussing different standards
Supreme Court applied for content-neutral and content-based regulations).
35. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 46; International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness,
Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992) [ISKON] (holding expressive regulations of public
forum or designated public forum valid only if narrowly tailored to accomplish
compelling state interest and regulations of nonpublic forums valid if reasonable).
For further discussion of Perry and ISKON, see infra notes 105, 120-22 and accom-
panying text.
36. See Stone, supra note 34, at 197-200 (noting Supreme Court has applied
stringent standard to all examples of viewpoint discrimination whether modest or
not); see also Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46 (recognizing applicability of strict scrutiny for
viewpoint restrictions even when forum is public property not open for expression
by tradition or designation).
37. 381 U.S. 1 (1965). The issue in Z7emel was whether the Secretary of State
could refuse to validate a citizen's passport. Id. at 16. The citizen alleged that the
First Amendment protects a citizen's right to travel abroad to obtain information
pertaining to the U.S. Government's foreign and domestic policies. See id.
[Vol. 4: p. 387
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information.3 8  Several years later, the Court recognized First
Amendment protection for news gathering in Branzburg v. Hayes.39
Justice Powell, in a concurring opinion, established a balancing test
that weighs the public's interest in obtaining information against
the government's interest in restricting access when deciding
whether a restriction on the media's access is constitutional. 40 The
Branzburg balancing test became the Court's primary analytical tool
in cases that address the media's right of access to prisons and
jails.41
1. The Media's Right of Access to Prisons and Jails
In Pell v. Procunier,42 the Court relying on the Branzburg balanc-
ing test, upheld a California Department of Corrections regulation
which prohibited the press and others from interviewing specific
inmates. 43 In Pell, three journalists claimed that the regulation vio-
lated the First Amendment freedom of the press by limiting their
38. Id. at 17. The Court recognized that this holding hindered the free flow
of information, but also recognized that holding to the contrary would allow citi-
zens access to forums, such as the White House, where unrestrained information
gathering is simply impermissible. See id.
39. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). Branzburg worked for a news journal and published
an article that pertained to the production of marijuana and included a photo-
graph of two pairs of hands working with the illegal substance. See id. at 667.
Branzburg was subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury about the identity of the
individuals in the photograph. See id. at 668. Branzburg claimed that the First
Amendment contained a right to gather news and that in order to maintain this
right it was necessary to keep sources confidential. See id. at 679-80.
40. See id. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring). In Branzburg, the Court analyzed
whether a reporter could be compelled to answer a grand jury subpoena and an-
swer questions pertaining to sources used in investigating criminal activity. Id. at
683. Justice Powell focused on whether a reporter's interest in not revealing confi-
dential information outweighed the public's interest in obtaining such informa-
tion at a grand jury proceeding. See id. at 710 (Powell,J., concurring). The Court
recognized that without protecting the right to gather information, the "freedom
of the press could be eviscerated." Id. at 681. However, Justice White, writing for
the majority, also declared that the First Amendment does not protect the press
from all burdens. See id. at 682. The press "has no special immunity from the
application of general laws." Id. at 683 (quoting Associated Press v. NLRB, 301
U.S. 103, 132-33 (1937)). Moreover, "the First Amendment does not guarantee
the press a constitutional right of special access to information not available to the
public generally." Id. at 684 (citing New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S.
713, 728-30 (1971); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965)). Ultimately, the
Court concluded that public interest in obtaining information at grand jury pro-
ceedings outweighed the press's interest in keeping information and sources confi-
dential. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 690-91.
41. See Seay, supra note 27, at 269.
42. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
43. Id. at 834-35. California Department of Corrections Manual section
415.071 prohibits press interviews with specified inmates. See id. at 819.
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news gathering activities. 4 4 Procunier, Director of the California
Department of Corrections, claimed that the California Penal Code
empowered him with the authority to institute such restrictions. 45
In rejecting the journalists' claim, the Court reasoned that "the
Constitution [does not] impose[ ] upon government the affirma-
tive duty to make available to journalists sources of information not
available to members of the public generally. '46 The Court agreed
with the prison administrators that the interest in preserving secur-
ity in the prisons outweighed the press's right to gather
information. 47
On the same day that it decided Pell, the Supreme Court also
decided Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.48 Members of the Washington
Post claimed that the federal prison administration abridged the
First Amendment right of news gathering when it refused to permit
interviews with specific inmates.49 Saxbe, the Attorney General,
44. Id. at 820-21. In addition to the journalists, four California prison inmates
joined the suit as plaintiffs claiming that their First Amendment right to free
speech was violated by the regulation. See id. at 821. The Court found no First
Amendment violation because inmates have adequate methods of communication
with the press aside from face-to-face interviews. See id. at 827-28. The Court noted
the prisoners' ability to communicate with members of the media in writing and
their ability to communicate with the press through family members, friends,
clergy and attorneys who were permitted to visit the inmates. See id. at 824-25.
45. See id. at 819 (1974). Disciplinary problems and security threats inside the
prisons resulted from the former policy of allowing the press to interview specific
inmates. See id. at 831. Inmates who chose not to follow prison regulations were
interviewed frequently and became notorious among fellow inmates. See id. at 831-
32. Other inmates wishing to attain the same status engaged in uncooperative
behavior thereby causing the correctional staff severe problems in their effort to
maintain a safe and secure environment. See id. Following a violent episode that
prison administrators felt was partially caused by allowing the press to freely inter-
view prisoners, Procunier instituted the restriction on media access. See id.
46. Id. at 834. In reaching its holding, the Court applied the balancing test
set forth by Justice Powell in Branzburg. See id. at 833. For a discussion of that
balancing test, see supra note 40 and accompanying text.
The Court also noted that the press actually does have a superior right over
the public to access information in California prisons. See Pell, 817 U.S. at 830.
Aside from being able to attend the public tours, the press may stop and speak
with inmates whom they encounter. See id. The press may also enter prisons and
interview inmates who are selected by corrections officials. See id. Further, if a
member of the press is writing a story about a prison program, access to inmate
participants is permitted. See id.
47. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 830 (1974).
48. 417 U.S. 843 (1974). Both cases were argued on April 17, 1974 and subse-
quently decided on June 24, 1974. See id.; Pell, 417 U.S. at 817.
49. See Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 844-45. Both the district court and the circuit court
agreed with the press's argument that the prison administration could not com-
pletely prohibit press interviews with federal inmates. See id. The circuit court
stated that interviews may be denied only when the prison administration shows a
high risk of disciplinary problems based on prior inmate conduct or special condi-
tions at the facility. See id. at 846.
[Vol. 4: p. 387
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contended that the press had no right superior to that of the public
in entering prisons. 50 The Court concluded that Pell and Saxbe were
indistinguishable. 51 Therefore, the Court merely reiterated its
holding from Pell, when it upheld the federal regulation restricting
the media's ability to interview specific inmates. 52
Just four years later, the Court again analyzed whether the me-
dia has a constitutional right of access to penitentiaries. 53 After re-
porting the suicide of a prisoner and the possibility that it was
caused by conditions in the county jail, KQED, a television and ra-
dio broadcasting station, sought access to the jail to investigate and
report their findings.54 The county denied KQED's access re-
quest. 55 In response, KQED filed suit requesting an injunction of
the policy that excluded KQED news personnel from the jail.5 6
KQED argued that the First Amendment provides for a right to
gather news and implies a right of access to "government-controlled
50. See id. at 846-47. Like the California policy at issue in Pell, the federal
statute in Saxbe only allowed admission to people who had "personal or profes-
sional ties to the inmates." Id. at 847. This included family, attorneys, religious
counsel and in some instances, friends. See id. at 846.
51. See Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 850. The only difference between Pell and Saxbe was
the regulation. In Pell, the press attacked California's Department of Corrections
Manual regulation section 415.071 as unconstitutional. 417 U.S. at 819. In Saxbe,
the press attacked Policy Statement 1220.1A of the Federal Bureau of Prisons.
Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 844. Both statutes limited the press's practice of conducting
face-to-face interviews with designated inmates.
52. See Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 850. The Court rationalized its holding in Saxbe in a
slightly different manner than it rationalized its holding in Pell See id. In Pel, the
Court stated that the First Amendment does not provide "newsmen . . .[with a]
constitutional right of access to prisons or their inmates beyond that afforded the
general public." Pell, 817 U.S. at 834. In Saxbe, the Court stated that it was unnec-
essary to weigh the press's interests against those of the prison administration be-
cause the limitation on news gathering resulted from the fact that prisons are
institutions not generally open to the public. Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 849.
53. See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978). The issue in Houchins
differed from the issue in Pell and Saxbe only in that KQED wanted to access a
countyjail as opposed to a state or federal prison and KQED wanted not only to be
able to interview inmates, but also film, photograph and record inmates and areas
of the jail. Id. at 3.
54. See id. No public access policy existed at the time the suit was filed, but
shortly thereafter, Houchins, the county sheriff, announced a program making
public tours available, but prohibited cameras, recorders and inmate interviews.
See id. at 4.
55. See id.
56. See id. KQED alleged that the most effective way to inform the public of
the conditions inside the jail was to allow television coverage within the facility and
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sources of information." 57 Relying on Pell and Saxbe, the Court held
that the First Amendment does not guarantee a right of access to all
information in the government's control.5 8 Quoting Pell, the Court
concluded that the media had "no constitutional right of access to
prisons or their inmates beyond that afforded the general public."
59
2. The Media's Right of Access to the Courtroom
When comparing cases restricting access to prisons with cases
permitting the media to attend criminal trials, the Court's policy
respecting the media's right to gather information is slightly ambig-
uous. The Supreme Court first recognized the media's right to
gather news in the courtroom during a criminal proceeding in Rich-
mond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia.60 Richmond Newspapers' report-
ers sought access to the courtroom arguing that the judge had not
considered alternatives to closing the trial that could ensure a fair
trial.6 1 The Supreme Court distinguished prison right of access
cases from cases dealing with the right of access to criminal trials,
finding that trials were traditionally open to the public whereas
prisons were not.62 The Court concluded that the First Amend-
57. Houchins, 438 U.S. at 13. According to KQED, the implied right to gov-
ernment information derives from the media's critical role of supplying the public
with information which safeguards the public from governmental abuses. See id.
58. See id. at 9. The Court agreed with many of KQED's assertions. See id. at 8.
KQED suggested, and the Court agreed, that prisons are of significant societal im-
portance, that prisons are funded primarily by the public, that increased informa-
tion about prisons would lead to more intelligent public opinions and that media
serves an important function as the "eyes and ears" of the public. See id. Neverthe-
less, the Court declined to conclude that the media's right of access was unlimited.
See id.
59. Id. at 12 (quoting Pell, 417 U.S. at 834). In reaching this holding, the
Court relied on Zemel v. Rusk where the Court held "[t] he right to speak and pub-
lish does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather information." Zemel, 381
U.S. 1, 17 (1965). For further discussion of Zeme/, see supra notes 37-38 and accom-
panying text.
60. 448 U.S. 555 (1980). In Richmond, a judge closed a murder trial after
defense counsel complained of the possibility that jurors might inaccurately view
information published in newspapers. Id. at 561. During the defendant's third
trial, a mistrial was declared because a prospective juror obtained information
from a newspaper article concerning the defendant's earlier trials. See id. at 559.
The juror then discussed the case with other prospective jurors before the retrial
commenced. See id.
61. See id. at 560.
62. See id. at 576 n.11. The Court described the long-standing tradition of
allowing the public into American courts and in earlier times, English courts. See
id. at 572. In recognizing the significance of public access to a criminal trial, the
Court noted that the press must inform the public about criminal proceedings
because in a democracy, it is the people who decide the fairness of the criminal
justice system. See id. at 574 n.9 (quoting Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc.,
338 U.S. 912, 920 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)). The Court emphasized the
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ment contains a freedom to listen and a "right to 'receive informa-
tion and ideas.' 63 Therefore, the press's right of access to criminal
trials may not be restricted arbitrarily. 64
Clarifying the test put forth in Richmond Newspapers, the Court
in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court65 declared that while no abso-
lute right of access exists to criminal trials, only a narrowly tailored
restriction supported by a compelling government interest is consti-
tutional. 66 The Globe challenged a Massachusetts statute that pro-
hibited public access to trials involving certain sexual offenses
where the victim was a minor. 67 The state emphasized two interests:
(1) protection of victims from trauma and humiliation and (2) the
greater likelihood that victims would testify and do so truthfully.68
The Court rejected both interests stating that the first was not com-
pelling enough and finding the second to be empirically unsubstan-
tiated.69 Thus, the Court found the statute unconstitutional.7 0
public's high concern for the manner in which criminal proceedings are con-
ducted. See id. at 577. The Court's ultimate conclusion was that "[t]he right of
access to places traditionally open to the public, as criminal trials have long been,
may be seen as assured by the amalgam of the First Amendment guarantees of
speech and press." Id. at 577.
63. Id. at 576 (quoting Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972)). The
First Amendment not only protects the press and free expression, it also restricts
the government's ability to limit the supply of information available to the public.
See id. at 575-76 (citing First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978)).
64. See id. at 576. The Court left room for future discretion by stating that the
media's access to observe trials may not be "arbitrarily" foreclosed. Id.
65. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
66. Id. at 606-07. Before reaching its holding on the substantive issue, the
Court in Globe dealt with a mootness challenge. Id. at 602. The government con-
tended that the case was moot because the trial that Globe Newspaper sought to
cover ended. See id. at 602-03. However, the Court found that when a case is "ca-
pable of repetition, yet evading review" a controversy exists. See id. at 603. Because
Globe Newspaper would likely be subjected to exclusion from trials in the future
under the same statute, the Court decided that the case was "capable of repeti-
tion." See id. Further, the Court concluded that whenever such a case was brought,
it would likely "evade review" because criminal trials are normally short. See id.
67. See id. at 598 n.1 (citing MAss. GEN. LAws ANN., ch. 278, § 16A (West
1981)). Globe Newspaper sought an injunction after a Massachusetts trial judge
ordered the courtroom closed in a forcible rape case involving two 16 year-old
victims and one 17 year-old victim. See id. at 598-99.
68. See id. at 607. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts listed addi-
tional interests, including the unhampered administration of justice and securing
fair convictions. See id.
69. See id. at 607-10. The Court found the statute unconstitutional because it
was not narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling interest of protecting the vic-
tims from trauma and humiliation. See id. Alternatives to this blanket prohibition
exist, such as allowing a trial court to use its discretion in deciding when to close a
court proceeding based on the age and maturity level of the victim, intrusiveness
of the crime and the desires of the victim and families involved. See id. at 608.
70. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 602 (1982).
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In reaching this conclusion, Justice Brennan, writing for the
majority in Globe, expressed two features explaining why public ac-
cess to a criminal trial exists. 71 First, criminal trials were tradition-
ally open to the public.72 Second, access to criminal trials
contributes to the functioning of the justice system. 73 The Court
later identified these two features as prerequisites to a finding of a
right of access to a criminal proceeding.7
4
Several years later, the press challenged the point in time when
right of public access to criminal trials attaches. 75 Press-Enterprise
argued that the press's right to attend criminal proceedings begins
with the voir dire proceedings. 76 The State contended that al-
lowing the press at voir dire proceedings would cause jurors to be
less open in their responses leading to an unfair trial.77 The
Supreme Court held that public access to voir dire proceedings
would not hinder the right to a fair trial or compromise the poten-
tial jurors' privacy interests. 78
In a similar suit, Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court 9 (Press-En-
terprise II), the Court exhibited its propensity for invalidating a pol-
icy that restricts access to an area or process traditionally open to
the public.8 0 The issue again related to when the public's right of
71. Id. at 605.
72. See id. Reiterating his concurrence in Richmond, Justice Brennan stated
that open access to criminal trials is grounded in the Constitution because of "the
gloss of history" and favorable experience of traditional access. Id.
73. See id. at 606. Public awareness of a trial improves the fact-finding func-
tion of the proceeding and therefore benefits all involved as well as society gener-
ally. See id. Furthermore, access to criminal trials creates a perception of fairness
and thereby legitimizes the proceedings. See id.
74. See Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
75. See Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984) [hereinafter
Press-Enterprise 1]. In Press-Enterprise I, the Court addressed whether the right of
access to criminal trials extends to the voir dire proceedings. Id. at 503.
76. See id. Press-Enterprise also sought a complete transcript of the voir dire
proceedings. See id. The trial judge refused this because of an "implied promise of
confidentiality" that exists during voir dire examination and because of a possible
privacy infringement. Id. at 504.
77. See id. at 503. The trial judge allowed access to the general voir dire, but
not to special voir dire pertaining to death qualifications or other possibly prob-
lematic areas. See id.
78. See id. at 513. In reaching this conclusion, the Court alluded to the histor-
ical openness of jury selection. See id. at 505-08. The Court also stressed that ac-
cess to voir dire leads to a fairer trial and increases public confidence in the
criminal justice system. See id. at 508. Justice Brennan previously expressed these
same two features in Globe. Globe, 457 U.S. at 605-06. In Press-Enterprise I, as in
Globe, the Court did not require the presence of these two features, but merely
referred to them as important factors. See Hayes, supra note 29, at 1119.
79. 478 U.S. 1 (1986) [hereinafter Press-Enterprise I1].
80. Id.
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access attaches during criminal proceedings.8' In finding a public
right of access to preliminary hearings in California, the Supreme
Court explicitly enunciated a two prong test requiring: (1) a tradi-
tion of openness of the proceeding and (2) that public access play a
significant role in the functioning of the criminal proceeding.8 2
This two part analysis appears to be the last word from the Supreme
Court with regard to the right of access issue.8 3
B. The Right To Gather Information - Lower Court Precedent
To date, the Supreme Court recognized a right of access in
only one area, the courtroom.8 4 The Court never explicitly stated
that the courtroom is the only area in which the media has a right
to gather information.85 Therefore, numerous lower courts ex-
tended a right of access to other areas.8 6 Because of the ambiguity
in the Supreme Court precedent pertaining to a right of access,
81. See id. at 3. Specifically, the issue was whether the First Amendment pro-
vides a right of access to the transcript of a preliminary hearing. See id.
82. See id. at 9. The Court specifically stated that a proceeding must pass the
tests of "experience and logic" before a qualified right of access attaches. Id. Once
the Court finds a right of public access, the government must pass the strict scru-
tiny test announced in Globe to overcome this right. See id.
83. See Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Chester, 797 F.2d 1164 (3d Cir. 1986)
(applying two part analysis from Press-Enterprise 11). Times Leader, the plaintiff,
sought access to the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources
(D.E.R.). See id. at 1165. The drinking water in northeast Pennsylvania caused an
outbreak of intestinal illness and Times Leader wanted to investigate D.E.R.'s po-
tential culpability. See id. Times Leader argued that the First Amendment pro-
vided it with a "right to know." Id. D.E.R. countered that it could restrict public
access to certain information, specifically, released documents that would cause a
reduction in federal funding. See id. at 1166. The Third Circuit assumed that the
Supreme Court's analysis of access to judicial proceedings applied to the media's
request to access executive branch files. See id. at 1174. Therefore, the Third Cir-
cuit addressed whether a tradition of openness existed and whether the public
access played a significant positive role in the functioning of the executive branch.
See id. The Third Circuit concluded that the complaint should be dismissed be-
cause Times Leader failed to demonstrate a tradition of openness. See id.
84. See supra notes 60-83 and accompanying text. While the Court addressed
a right of access to prisons, it declined to adopt this right. See supra notes 43-59
and accompanying text.
85. See Hayes, supra note 29, at 1121. Hayes suggests that the Court intended
the right of access to extend to areas other than the courtroom. See id. In Press-
Enterprise 11, the Court did not restrict its holding to the right of access in criminal
proceedings. See id. Hayes also argues that the two prong test logically applies to
other proceedings and government information generally. See id. Hayes substanti-
ates this argument by relying on Justice Stevens' dissent in Press-Enterprise II, which
suggested that the right of access extends beyond the criminal justice system. See
id. (citing Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 27-28 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
86. For a discussion of lower court cases relating to the media's right of ac-
cess, see infra notes 88-104 and accompanying text.
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lower courts sometimes apply the two prong analysis from Press-En-
terprise II and other times apply a balancing test.8 7
1. Application of the Two Prong Test
Some lower courts utilized the two prong test to expand the
right of access.88 For instance, the Third Circuit found a First
Amendment right of access to criminal indictments.8 9 Similarly,
the Ninth Circuit held that a First Amendment right of access exists
for documents filed during criminal proceedings. 90 The Ninth Cir-
cuit also found a First Amendment right of access to post-conviction
proceedings. 91
Lower courts also applied the two prong analysis and extended
the right of access to areas outside of criminal proceedings. 92 Sev-
eral circuit courts recognized a right of access to civil proceedings
because of a tradition of openness and the significant role access
87. For a discussion of cases applying the two prong analysis, see infra notes
88-94 and accompanying text. For examples of cases applying the balancing test,
see infra notes 95-104 and accompanying text.
88. See Hayes, supra note 29, at 1123.
89. See United States v. Smith, 776 F.2d 1104 (3d Cir. 1985). Defendants
sought access to bills of particulars to discover the identity of unindicted co-con-
spirators. See id. at 1105. The government argued that releasing the names of co-
conspirators would intrude on privacy rights. See id. at 1107. The court concluded
that public access to indictments serves the same societal interest as access to bills
of particulars and therefore considered public access to indictments. See id. at
1111. In applying the two prong test and finding a right of access to indictments,
the Third Circuit noted the tradition of openness to indictments and necessity of
allowing public access to indictments to ensure the fairness of the criminal process.
See id. at 1112.
In a recent decision, the United States District Court for the District of Dela-
ware recognized a First Amendment right of access to sealed criminal documents.
See United States v. Gonzalez, 927 F. Supp. 768 (D. Del. 1996). This court made
clear that both a common law right of access and a First Amendment right of
access existed. See id. at 785. The court analyzed the common law right using a
balancing test and applied the two prong test from Press Enterprise II to find a First
Amendment right of access. See id. at 773.
90. See Associated Press v. United States Dist. Court, 705 F.2d 1143 (9th Cir.
1983). The district judge ordered future filings of documents to be automatically
sealed. See id. at 1144. The court relied on Globe's two justifications for finding a
First Amendment right of access: historical openness and access must play a signifi-
cant role in the functioning of the proceeding or government. See id. at 1145. The
court found a historical right of access to pretrial documents. See id. It also found
that pretrial documents related to incarceration prior to trial or to allegations of
government abuse were important to the functioning of the proceeding and soci-
ety generally. See id.
91. See CBS v. United States Dist. Court, 765 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1985)
(presuming public right of access to criminal proceedings and documents and
finding no reason not to extend this right to post-trial documents and
proceedings).
92. See Hayes, supra note 29, at 1124.
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plays in the functioning of the proceeding.9 3 One district court
used the two prong analysis to find a right of access to fact-finding
hearings. 94
2. Application of the Balancing Test
Some lower courts applied a balancing test identical to the test
set forth by the Supreme Court in Branzburg to decide the right of
access issue.95 These courts balanced the public's interests in gath-
ering specific information against the government's interests in re-
stricting access to such information. 96 For example, the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia addressed
whether televised media representatives possessed a First Amend-
ment right of access to limited coverage of White House events.97
The media argued that complete exclusion of televised media vio-
lated the First Amendment because it interfered with news coverage
and the public's right to receive information 8  The government
expressed no interests served by excluding televised media.99 The
93. See id. at 1123 n.109 (citing Westmoreland v. CBS, 752 F.2d 16 (2d Cir.
1984); Publicker Indus. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1984); In re Continental
Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302 (7th Cir. 1984); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.
v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165 (6th Cir. 1983)).
94. See Society of Prof'lJournalists v. Secretary of Labor, 616 F. Supp. 569 (D.
Utah 1985). Since fact-finding hearings were a relatively new procedure, there was
no historic tradition of openness. See id. at 575. However, the court analogized
such proceedings to civil trials and therefore found a tradition of openness for this
type of hearing. See id. The court also found that access contributed to the func-
tioning of the government generally since fact-finding hearings may involve situa-
tions that significantly impact the community. See id. at 576.
95. For a discussion of the Branzburg balancing test and Supreme Court deci-
sions applying it, see supra notes 40-59 and accompanying text.
96. See Hayes, supra note 29, at 1126.
97. See CNN v. ABC, 518 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D. Ga. 1981). CNN sought access
to limited coverage events at the White House. See id. at 1240. The White House
set up pools of media representatives allowed to attend such events. See id. at 1239.
The Press Office announced a policy of allowing five spaces to television media
representatives. See id. at 1240. The policy required the news media to choose who
would comprise the five spots. See id. If a consensus could not be reached among
the media representatives, televised media representatives would be excluded. See
id. The White House Press Office excluded all televised representatives when they
failed to reach a consensus. See id.
98. See id. at 1241. The Court recognized several public and media interests
in establishing a right of access for televised media. First, television is the only
source of news for some citizens. See id. at 1245. Second, visual images may en-
hance the impression of news events. See id. Third, television provides a compre-
hensiveness and immediacy not intrinsic to print media. See id.
99. See id. The court listed certain factors that may limit a right of access
including: "confidentiality, security, orderly process, [and] spatial limitations." Id.
at 1244. The government failed to argue any of these. See id. at 1245.
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court decided the balancing test in favor of the media because the
public possessed interests while the government expressed none.100
The United States District Court for the District of Massachu-
setts applying the balancing test found a restriction unconstitu-
tional that limited a broadcaster's right of access to airplane crash
sites. 101 Westinghouse Broadcasting claimed that the restriction vi-
olated the First Amendment by infringing on the press's interest in
gathering news and disseminating information to the public.10 2
The safety board countered that limitations on access were neces-
sary to ensure an efficient and accurate investigation.10 3 The court
balanced these interests and concluded that the restrictions placed
on the media's right of access were unconstitutional. 10 4
C. Forum Classification and Content-Based Regulations
The Supreme Court classified public forums into three areas
for purposes of analyzing First Amendment claims.' 0 5 First, areas
traditionally open to expressive activity, such as sidewalks, streets
and parks are public forums. 10 6 Second, the Court deems areas
100. See id.
101. See Westinghouse Broad, Inc. v. National Transp. Safety Bd., 8 Media L.
Rep. 1177 (D. Mass. 1982). The restriction at issue limited press access to one
hour a day to a particular crash site. See id. at 1179.
102. See id. Westinghouse expressed specific interests in providing televised
coverage. See id. at 1182. Westinghouse argued that television, unlike other me-
dia, provides the viewer with what is actually transpiring at the moment. See id.
103. See id. The safety board was concerned that the media might take pieces
of the wreckage or other items from the site which would disturb the investigation.
See id. at 1179. The court listed other interests in favor of the safety board such as
"confidentiality, security, orderly process, [and] spatial limitations." Id. at 1181
(citing CNN v. ABC, 518 F. Supp. 1238, 1244 (N.D. Ga. 1981)).
104. See id. at 1184. The court relied on the balancing test as set forth by the
Supreme Court in Houchins. See id. at 1182.
105. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46
(1982). In Perry, a teachers union (PLEA) challenged the constitutionality of a
school board's decision which restricted access to teachers' mailboxes to the union
who represented the teachers. See id. at 39. PLEA argued that this restriction vio-
lated the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause because of its prefer-
ential access for the teachers' union. See id. at 41. The Court discussed the
characteristics of traditional public forums, designated public forums and non-
traditional public forums. See id. at 45-46. The Court concluded that the school
mail box system was a designated public forum and therefore reasonable content-
neutral restrictions were permissible. See id. at 48-49. The Court upheld the con-
tent-neutral restrictions because labor-peace within schools was a reasonable justifi-
cation for the restriction. See id. at 52.
106. See Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939). For further discussion of Hague
and other cases establishing the rules related to restrictions on speech in public
forums, see infra notes 109-13 and accompanying text. See also International Soc'y
for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 698 (1992) (Kennedy, J., con-
curring). Justice Kennedy suggested looking at three factors to determine whether
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which the government has opened to the public for expressive ac-
tivity as designated public forums, and treats them similarly to tradi-
tional public forums.107 Third, public property not traditionally
open for expressive activity and not designated as a forum for ex-
pressive activity receives different analysis than public forums and
designated public forums.108
The Supreme Court applies strict standards to regulations that
restrict speech in public forums. 109 Content-based restrictions for
public forums must serve a compelling state interest and be nar-
rowly tailored to achieve the interest. 110 In Police Department of Chi-
cago v. Mosley, a federal postal employee challenged the
constitutionality of a Chicago ordinance that prohibited picketing
on a public way within 150 feet of a school."' The employee ar-
gued that the statute was discriminatory because it prohibited all
forms of picketing except when the participants were involved in a
school labor dispute. 1 2 The Court concluded that selective exclu-
sion from a public place was not permissible." 3
an area is a public forum. See id. The first consideration was whether the property
shares objective, physical similarities with traditional public forums. See id. Sec-
ond, Justice Kennedy suggested looking at the extent to which the government
acquiesced in permitting access to the property. See id. Third, Justice Kennedy
suggested considering whether the expressive activity would significantly interfere
with the government's designated use of the property. See id.
107. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981). For further discussion of
Widmar and the rules pertaining to restrictions on speech in designated forums,
see infra notes 114-19 and accompanying text.
108. See International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672
(1992). For further discussion of ISKON and the rules relating to restrictions on
free speech in nonpublic forums, see infra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
109. See Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939). In Hague, the plurality noted that
streets and other public places were areas traditionally used for public assembly
and the communication of ideas between citizens. Id. at 515. The privilege to use
such areas for communication "must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged
or denied." Id. at 516.
110. See Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 101 (1972) (requiring
regulations that abridge First Amendment interest to be narrowly tailored to
achieve substantial government interest); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980)
(following Mosley).
111. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 93.
112. See id. Mosley frequently picketed on a public sidewalk adjoining Jones
Commercial High School before this ordinance was enacted. See id. He carried a
sign stating: "Jones High School practices black discrimination. Jones High School
has a black quota." Id. After enactment of the ordinance, Mosley filed suit claim-
ing that the statute violated the First Amendment and by allowing a specific group
to picket and not others it violated equal protection of the law. See id. at 94.
113. See id. at 95. The Court held the Chicago ordinance unconstitutional
because it restricted speech on the basis of subject matter. See id. One line of the
Court's opinion summarizes its entire rationale: "above all else, the First Amend-
ment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content." Id.
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Virtually the same standards apply to designated public forums
as apply to traditional public forums.1 14 While a state maintains an
area as open for expressive activity, reasonable time, place and
manner restrictions are constitutional, but content-based regula-
tions that are not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state
interest are unconstitutional.1 5 In Widmar v. Vincent,11 6 a student
organization challenged a state university's regulation that prohib-
ited the organization from meeting in university buildings for reli-
gious purposes. 117 The Court concluded that this regulation was
subject to the same standard of review as content-based exclusions
in traditional public forums because the university opened its facili-
ties to registered organizations, thereby creating a designated fo-
rum. 1 18 The Court found the regulation unconstitutional because
the university's regulation did not achieve its compelling
interest. 119
Regulations that restrict public communication in nonpublic
forums receive less scrutiny than regulations pertaining to tradi-
tional public forums or designated public forums. In International
Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, the Supreme Court upheld a
statute that banned distributing written material and soliciting
funds at three major airports. 120 The International Society for
Krishna Consciousness (ISKON) challenged the statute claiming
that it violated free speech. 121 Justice Rehnquist concluded that an
114. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46
(1982). For discussion of Perry, see supra note 105.
115. See id.
116. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
117. Id. at 265. The student religious group received permission to conduct
its meetings in university buildings from 1973 to 1977. See id. The university's
regulation deprived the student organization of its First Amendment rights related
to a designated public forum. See id. at 267-68.
118. See id. at 269-70.
119. See id. at 270-71. The Court concluded that the university's desire to
maintain strict separation of church and state was a compelling interest. See id. at
271. However, the Court found that allowing religious organizations to meet in
the designated public forums would not violate the Establishment Clause. See id.
120. International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 685
(1992). The Port Authority of New York and NewJersey adopted a regulation that
prohibited selling or distributing merchandise, selling or distributing printed or
written material and soliciting funds at La Guardia, Kennedy and Newark airports
by a person to passers-by in a repetitive manner. See id. at 675-76. This regulation
applied only to airport terminals and not to sidewalks outside the terminals. See id.
at 676.
121. See id. ISKON members perform a ritual called sankirtan which requires
them to distribute religious material and solicit funds in a public place. See id. at
674.
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airport is not a traditional public forum and held that regulations
on speech in such forums must only be reasonable. 122
Similarly, in Greer v. Spock,123 the Court confronted the consti-
tutionality of regulations banning political demonstrations and dis-
tribution of political material at Fort Dix military base. 124 Spock
filed suit contending that the Fort Dix regulations violated the First
and Fifth Amendments of the Constitution.1 25 The Supreme Court
distinguished an earlier decision in which it held that if streets on a
military base were open to the public, the military abandons the
interest of banning the distribution of leaflets. 126 In Greer, the mili-
tary had not abandoned any interest in regulating political
speeches or dissemination of information and therefore the Court
concluded that the military had the "power to preserve the property
under its control for the use to which it [was] lawfully
dedicated." 127
122. See id. at 680. The Court required that the regulation on speech be rea-
sonable and prohibited any government restriction on speech that was based on a
speaker's viewpoint. See id. at 679.
123. 424 U.S. 828 (1976). The plaintiffs were members of both the People's
Party and Socialist Workers Party. See id. at 832. They sought admission to Fort
Dix for the purpose of distributing political literature and speaking to soldiers
about election issues. See id. Spock and others were ejected from Fort Dix on
previous occasions when they were caught distributing political literature. See id. at
833.
124. Id. at 831. Fort Dix regulation 210-26 prohibited speeches and demon-
strations of a political nature. See id. A separate regulation prohibited the distribu-
tion of newspapers, magazines, leaflets and other similar material. See id.
However, the latter regulation did not prohibit the distribution of campaign litera-
ture. See id. To prohibit such distribution, a base commander must show some
threat to the loyalty of troops or security of the base. See id. at 831 n.2.
125. See id. at 834. The district court eventually held that the military could
not interfere with the dissemination of political matter or the making of political
speeches in areas generally open to the public at Fort Dix and the court of appeals
affirmed. See id.
126. See id. at 835. See Flower v. United States, 407 U.S. 197, 198 (1972) (rea-
soning that area attempting to be regulated by military was public street because of
its unlimited openness to all forms of public transportation and private vehicles
and therefore was proper place for dissemination of information). But cf United
States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 686 (1985) (suggesting that where military has not
completely abandoned control of military base, it may restrict speech because mili-
tary bases are not ordinarily public forums for First Amendment purposes).
127. Greer, 424 U.S. at 836 (quoting Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47
(1966)). In Adderly, a group of students staging a demonstration were arrested for
trespassing on jail grounds. Adderly, 385 U.S. at 40. The students claimed that
these arrests denied them a First Amendment right of free speech and assembly.
See id. at 41. The Court rejected the students' claim because the "Constitution
does not forbid a State to control the use of its own property for its own lawful
nondiscriminatory purpose." Id. at 48.
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The Supreme Court will not tolerate discrimination on the ba-
sis of viewpoint regardless of the type of forum at issue. 123 In Sherrill
v. Knight,129 the D.C. Circuit recognized that the government may
not arbitrarily deny a newsman access to information.130 Sherrill, a
member of the press, argued that the government's denial of a
White House press pass without a stated reason violated the First
Amendment.131 The court concluded that when the Secret Service
denies a press pass, it must provide notice and an opportunity to
rebut, followed by a written decision. 132 The court stressed that the
government violates the First Amendment when it excludes individ-
uals on the basis of their viewpoints. 133
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
In JB Pictures, the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit addressed three issues.134 First, the court
considered whether the case was moot due to the conclusion of
Operation Desert Storm.135 Second, the court analyzed the central
issue of whether the media has a First Amendment right of access to
Dover Air Force Base to view the caskets of deceased soldiers.13
6
Third, the court looked at whether the restrictions on the public or
press somehow abridged the First Amendment right of free
speech.13 7
128. See Stone, supra note 34, at 197-201. Stone writes that viewpoint discrimi-
nation is perceived as repugnant because it extracts a particular message from pub-
lic expression. See id. at 198. It compromises public debate and a community's
thinking process which violates the core principles of the First Amendment. See id.
129. 569 F.2d 124 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
130. Id. at 129-30. In Sherrill, the White House opened press facilities to news-
men for purposes of gathering information. Id.
131. See id. When the White House denied Sherrill's request for a press pass,
it provided only that denial was for security reasons. See id. at 127. Sherrill re-
quested a more specific reason for the denial and was denied any further reason.
See id.
132. See id. at 128. The court declined to require detailed reasons for a press
pass denial, but found that a denial of a press pass infringed enough on the First
Amendment to require procedural due process. See id.
133. See id. The government may not deny a press pass on the basis of con-
tent-based criteria. See id.
134. JB Pictures v. Department of Defense, 86 F.3d 236, 238 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
135. See id. For the court's analysis of the mootness issue, see infra notes 138-
41 and accompanying text.
136. See id. at 238-41. For a description of the court's First Amendment right
of access analysis, see infra notes 141-63 and accompanying text.
137. See id. at 241. For an analysis of the court's rejection of the Veterans' for
Peace claim that the military restrictions abridged the First Amendment's right of
free speech, see infra notes 165-68 and accompanying text.
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Prior to dealing with the central issue of freedom of access, the
D.C. Circuit Court addressed whether the case was moot. 138 The
Department of Defense argued that no true controversy existed be-
cause Operation Desert Storm ended in 1992.139 In opposition, JB
Pictures asserted that the government's policy would likely enjoin
access in the future. 140 In finding a live case or controversy, the
court concluded that the case remained live because of the govern-
ment's continuing policy of prohibiting the media's access. 141
After concluding that a live controversy existed, the D.C. Cir-
cuit Court began its analysis with the proposition that the First
Amendment does not create an unrestricted right of access to gov-
ernment events. 142 The court substantiated this proposition by ana-
lyzing prior Supreme Court decisions.1 43 Next, the court applied
the balancing test set forth in Branzburg v. Hayes.144 The court com-
pared the government's interest in restricting access with the
press's desire to access an area in order to facilitate reporting. 145
The Department of Defense expressed two interests that the court
found superior to the media's interest of disseminating information
to the public. 146 First, the policy reduced hardship on the soldiers'
families by returning the bodies to a home or duty base thereby
preventing the families from feeling compelled to travel to Dover
138. SeeJB Pictures, 86 F.3d at 238. The court declared that the mootness issue
may be raised at any time because it is a jurisdictional defense. See id. (citing St.
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531 (1978)).
139. See id. The government argued for dismissal of the case on mootness
grounds even though it intended to continue to exclude the media from viewing
the bodies at Dover. See id.
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. See id. According to the court, the press's right to government activities
should not be unrestricted merely because unlimited access would allow more
thorough reporting. See id.
143. SeeJB Pictures, 86 F.3d at 238-39. The D.C. Circuit cited Zemel v. Rusk
where the Supreme Court recognized that although restrictions to the White
House impede thorough reporting, no First Amendment right exists for such ac-
cess. See id. (quoting Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965)). Similarly, although the
press may more thoroughly report events of a war from the battleground, it is
often precluded from doing so by governmental restrictions. See Nation Magazine
v. Department of Defense, 762 F. Supp. 1558, 1574 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (discussing
reasons such as national security and secrecy of military strategy to prohibit the
press' unrestricted access to battlefield). For a discussion of press coverage in
prior wars see Boydston, supra note 7, at 1074-88 (examining media's access to wars
from American War of Independence to Persian Gulf War); Seay, supra note 27, at
255-63 (analyzing ongoing conflict between media and military in times of war).
144. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). For a discussion of the facts and analysis of
Branzburg, see supra notes 3941.
145. SeeJB Pictures, 86 F.3d at 239.
146. See id. at 240-41.
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for ceremonies. 147 Second, the Department of Defense argued an
interest in protecting the privacy of the deceased's family and
friends who may not want the arrival of the deceased broad-
casted.1 48 Furthermore, the court reasoned that the policy of al-
lowing the families to consent to media coverage was consistent
with these two interests and therefore found the entire policy
constitutional. 149
In further establishing the constitutionality of the policy, the
court distinguished the line of cases that granted a right of access
for the media in the courtroom.1 50 Restrictions on access to crimi-
nal proceedings differ from restrictions on access to prisons and
military bases, because, unlike prisons and military bases, criminal
proceedings were traditionally open to the public.15 ' Since military
bases are not places traditionally open to the press or public, the
government need not show a compelling interest to restrict the
press. 15 2 The government only needs to show one or more interests
that outweigh the media's interest in obtaining information.
53
147. See id. at 241. JB Pictures claimed that the government's concern for the
families possibly having to travel great distances to attend the ceremonies at Dover
could be avoided if no ceremonies were held at Dover. See id. The court, however,
believed that families might still feel compelled to travel to Dover just to be present
for the deceased's arrival in the United States. See id. Furthermore, the court
stated that the Constitution does not force the government to make a choice be-
tween having no ceremony, thereby making the government appear insensitive, or
having a ceremony, thereby burdening the bereaved which again would make the
government appear insensitive. See id.
148. See id. The court explained that the privacy interest will vary with the
number of dead soldiers returning at one time because the fewer the caskets, the
easier it would be to surmise the identity of the soldiers. See id.
149. SeeJB Pictures, 86 F.3d at 241.
150. See id. at 239. The court cited three cases involving the media's right of
access to criminal proceedings in which the Supreme Court upheld the media's
interest. See id. The court distinguished these cases on the basis that courtrooms
were traditionally open to the public and military bases were not. Compare Press-
Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984) (holding press and public have
right of access to voir dire examination of potential jurors); Richmond Newspa-
pers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (concluding press has right of access to
criminal trials); and Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982)
(agreeing with holding in Richmond), with Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974)
(holding press has no right to interview specific inmates in prisons); and Saxbe v.
Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974) (following Pell). For a further discus-
sion of these cases, see supra notes 75-78, 60-64, 65-70, 42-47 and 48-52 respectively
and accompanying text.
151. SeeJB Pictures, 86 F.3d at 239. The media's right of access to criminal
proceedings can only be restricted if the government demonstrates a compelling
interest. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606-07 (1982).
For a further discussion of Globe, see supra notes 65-70.
152. SeeJB Pictures, 86 F.3d at 239.
153. See id. This is essentially the balancing test utilized in Branzburg v. Hayes.
408 U.S. 665 (1972). For a discussion of the balancing test, see supra note 40 and
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Next, the court addressed JB Pictures' claim that the Depart-
ment of Defense policy was discriminatory and not viewpoint neu-
tral. 154 The D.C. Circuit Court dismissed this argument by stating
that all media and the public were uniformly subject to the restric-
tion. 155 The court also found the "viewpoint biased" argument de-
void of merit. 156 The court reasoned that the sight of dead soldiers
returning would not necessarily bias the public's perspective of the
war because the return of war dead is not "an event necessarily
laden with anti-war implications.' 1 5 7 Furthermore, the court ex-
pressed the opinion that departing supplies and soldiers was not
necessarily a positive event.1 58 Even if the restriction produced a
biased perspective, the court reasoned it would not necessarily be
unconstitutional since the Supreme Court previously upheld re-
strictive policies that produced biased portrayals of prisons.' 59
The court flatly rejectedJB Pictures' contention that this policy
is discriminatorv because Dover was at one time open for the pur-
pose of viewing the returning war dead. 60 In addition, the court
concluded that the government may institute new restrictions with-
out being subjected to a claim of discriminatory practice each time
it does so. 16 1
accompanying text. The D.C. Circuit Court also noted that the Third Circuit held
that a claim to a right of access cannot succeed unless there is a tradition of open-
ness irrespective of the strengths of the interests put forth by the government or
the media. Seeid. (citing Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Chester, 797 F.2d 1164, 1173-
76 (3d Cir. 1986)).
154. SeeJB Pictures, 86 F.3d at 239. JB Pictures claimed that the sight of re-
turning dead soldiers conveyed a perspective entirely different from the sights of
soldiers and supplies going off to war and that by restricting the broadcast of the
returning dead the public was receiving a biased perspective of the war. See id.
155. See id. The court distinguished this case from another D.C. Circuit Court
decision which found a discriminatory practice in the Secret Service's procedures
of denying certain journalists access to the White House without providing a rea-
son. See Sherrill v. Knight, 569 F.2d 124 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
156. SeeJB Pictures, 86 F.3d at 239.
157. Id. The court alluded to the Gettysburg Address and Pericles' speech
during the Peloponnesian War to suggest that the event of returning dead soldiers
does not always insight anti-war sentiment. See id.
158. See id.
159. See Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974) (upholding re-
striction on media even though it meant that public might receive less than candid
perspective on prison life because reporters were barred from interviewing in-
mates of their choosing). The JB Pictures court suggested that the viewpoint biased
broadcasting occurs frequently in covering the political realm since politicians
showcase positive events and remain "behind the scenes" during negative ones. JB
Pictures, 86 F.3d at 240. The court also stated that virtually all restrictions would be
impermissible if they were banned because of possible viewpoint discrimination.
See id.
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According to the court in JB Pictures, the Department of De-
fense's restriction places an insignificant burden on the media be-
cause reporters will receive no new information by gaining access to
the returning deceased soldiers.' 6 2 The court found this policy less
restrictive than the one upheld in Pell and Saxbe.163 In Pell and
Saxbe the restrictions actually inhibited the collection of some facts
whereas here the policy does not suppress information concerning
the number and identity of soldiers killed. 164
Finally, the court dealt with plaintiffs' claim that the policy un-
constitutionally denied them a right to speak.165 The Veterans for
Peace intended to "witness and pay their respects" to the deceased
at Dover.1 66 Although the term "witness" may connote an expres-
sive activity in some contexts, the court reasoned that what the Vet-
erans for Peace truly desired was to see the returning caskets. 167
Therefore, the court decided that this claim was identical to plain-
tiffs' right of access claim and refused to find the policy unconstitu-
tional on this basis. 168
162. See id. The court remindedJB Pictures that the policy is not a complete
bar to arrival ceremonies since the media may gain access at interment cites or
home bases with the family's consent. See id. Like other restrictive policies upheld
by the Supreme Court, this policy does not completely prevent media access. See
Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 846 (1974) (noting that press still
enjoyed "substantial" access to prisoners even with policy in place).
163. SeefB Pictures, 86 F.3d at 240.
164. See id. In Pell and Saxbe the restriction actually limited the information
that reporters were able to obtain because certain inmates and areas of the prison
were off limits to the media. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974); Saxbe v. Wash-
ington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974). In JB Pictures, no impediment existed as to
the information, only the images. JB Pictures, 86 F.3d at 240.
165. SeeJB Pictures, 86 F.3d at 241. In a memorandum opinion, the district
court concluded thatJB Pictures' free speech claim lacked merit because the De-
partment of Defense policy does not restrict the media's right to speak at Dover.
SeeJB Pictures v. Department of Defense, 21 Media L. Rep. 1564, 1566 n.6 (D. D.C.
1993). It merely restricts the media's free access to the base. See id.
166. JB Pictures, 86 F.3d at 241.
167. See id. The text surrounding the claim that Veterans for Peace (VFP)
intended to "witness" the war dead provides more evidence that what VFP wanted
to do was see rather than speak at Dover. See id. The VFP is described as an organ-
ization that desires to abolish all wars. See id. It provides the public with war re-
lated information and therefore, the court concluded that, like the media, VFP was
merely concerned with "carrying a message from Dover" rather than speaking
there. See id.
168. See id. The VFP was not the only plaintiff claiming that the policy
abridged a freedom to speak. See id. However, the other claims, like the VFP's,
were concerned with not being able to inform the public. See id. According to the
court, this claim although guised as a free speech claim is truly a right of access
claim. See id.
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V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
Criticism exists concerning the D.C. Circuit Court's opinion in
JB Pictures. First, the court inaccurately resolved the balancing test
in favor of the government. The media's interest in JB Pictures was
more significant than in prior right of access cases and the govern-
ment's expressed interests lacked both strength and legitimacy.
Second, the court improperly dismissed JB Pictures' viewpoint
based restriction argument.
The Supreme Court's limited analysis of cases dealing with the
media's right to gather information makes it difficult for lower
courts to decide what test to apply when the place or process seek-
ing to be accessed is not a courtroom or prison. 169 While the
Supreme Court handled First Amendment issues pertaining to mili-
tary bases, it never specifically addressed whether a right of access
for news gathering purposes existed. 1 70 Judging by Supreme Court
and lower court precedent, the u.C. uircuit properly chose to apply
the balancing test utilized in Pell, Saxbe, and Houchins as opposed to
applying the two prong analysis expressed in Press-Enterprise II. The
Supreme Court applied the two prong analysis exclusively to crimi-
nal proceedings and lower courts merely extended its application
to documents in criminal proceedings and to civil proceedings. 17 1
169. See Seay, supra note 27, at 271-72 (noting "[t]he constitutional status of
news gathering became murkier" when Supreme Court decided right of access
exists to judicial proceedings). The prison right of access cases established the
proposition that the First Amendment provides no guaranteed right of access to
information within government control. See id. at 270. Right of access to judicial
proceedings for news gathering purposes exists because these proceedings were
traditionally open to the public. See id. at 272. In an attempt to predict whether
the Supreme Court would allow access to remote-sensing satellite imagery, Seay
notes that the two categories of right of access cases the Court dealt with are so
different that making such a prediction would be pure speculation. See id.
170. SeeGreerv. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (holding military base is nonpub-
lic forum for free speech purposes); Flower v. United States, 407 U.S. 197 (1972)
(concluding that certain roads on military base were public forums due to com-
plete openness to public); United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675 (1985) (holding
that military bases are not ordinarily public forums). For a discussion of these
cases, see supra notes 123-27 and accompanying text.
171. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (recog-
nizing tradition of openness of courtroom and function of informing society of
criminal justice system); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596
(1982) (following Richmond and holding only compelling justification can over-
come public right of access to criminal proceedings); Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior
Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986) (establishing two prong analysis formally).
Lower courts have not applied the two prong analysis to situations outside of
criminal or civil proceedings. See United States v. Smith, 776 F.2d 1104 (3d Cir.
1985) (applying two prong analysis and finding right of access to indictments);
Associated Press v. United States Dist. Ct., 705 F.2d 1143 (9th Cir. 1983) (applying
two prong analysis and finding right of access to pretrial documents). But see Soci-
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Therefore, applying the two prong test to the right to gather infor-
mation at military bases is inappropriate. 172
Although the D.C. Circuit applied the appropriate test, it re-
solved the balancing test incorrectly. In JB Pictures, the court ana-
lyzed the balancing test utilized in Pell v. Procunier73 and Saxbe v.
Washington Post Co., 17 4 but it failed to distinguish between the
strength of the press's interest in a right of access in prisons and the
press's interest in a right of access to Dover Air Force Base. 175 In
both cases, the press's interest is gathering and disseminating infor-
mation to make the public aware of government policies.' 76 This
interest appears more compelling in a situation, like that in JB Pic-
tures, in which government decisions resulted in loss of human life
rather than a situation where a prison administration possibly vio-
lated criminals' rights. 177
The D.C. Circuit refuted the idea that access to Dover to view
the war dead is substantially more important than access to prisons
to speak with designated inmates by concluding that no new infor-
mation will be revealed by allowing the press to view the caskets. 178
While it is true that no new facts will be discovered by allowing press
access to Dover, media coverage at Dover would result in increased
ety of Prof'l Journalists v. Secretary of Labor, 616 F. Supp. 569 (D. Utah 1985)
(applying two prong analysis to fact-finding hearings because of similarity to civil
trials).
172. While stare decisis would suggest applying the balancing test, some corn-
mentors suggest that the two prong analysis is applicable to cases outside the court-
room. See Leonard G. Leverson, Constitutional Limits on the Power to Restrict Access to
Prisons: An Historical Re-examination, 18 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 409, 440-41 (1983).
Leverson researched historical public access to prisons and concluded that a tradi-
tion of openness existed and that public access served a function of enabling pris-
oners to petition for redress of grievances. See id.
173. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
174. 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
175. JB Pictures, 86 F.3d at 240.
176. See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) (reasoning that primary
purpose of First Amendment is to "protect the free discussion of governmental
affairs.") In Mills, the Court expressed the opinion that the press serves the func-
tion of keeping elected officials accountable to the people. Id.
177. See Rahdert, supra note 7, at 1540. Rahdert noted the public's especially
acute interest in access to information during a war. See id. Without access, citi-
zens are unable to obtain accurate information and therefore cannot properly en-
gage in the democratic process to prevent unnecessary wartime expenditures and
loss of blood. See id. Rahdert recognized information pertaining to the success or
failure of operations as extremely important. See id. The Department of Defense
restriction in JB Pictures, preventing viewing of war casualties, precludes proper
coverage of the American failures during Operation Desert Storm and as a result,
the democratic process suffers.
178. SeeJB Pictures, 86 F.3d at 240. The number of casualties and manner of
occurrence resulting from a military conflict will already be available to the press
and therefore access to Dover provides no new information. See id.
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dissemination of information. 179 Moreover, coverage of the cere-
monies at Dover provides the public with a realistic, emotional as-
pect of the events that a newspaper article cannot match.18 0
On the other side of the balancing test are the governments'
interests in protecting the bereaved families' privacy interests and
the interest in not making the friends and family of the deceased
feel obligated to travel to Dover for the arrival ceremonies. While
these interests are not insignificant, they appear trivial when com-
pared with the government's interest expressed in Pell and Saxbe of
maintaining prison security.18 1 In Pell, the restrictive policy func-
tioned to reduce prison violence where correctional officers' or in-
mates' lives were threatened. 182 In JB Pictures, the restriction on
press coverage merely mitigated a potential inconvenience and
slight intrusion on the families of the war casualties. In conclusion,
the less substantial government interest and the greater media in-
terest in JB Pictures, suggest that the D.C. Circuit Court should have
concluded that the media's interest outweighed that of the
government.
In addition, the legitimacy of the Department of Defense's in-
terests inJB Pictures is somewhat suspect. First, the deceased's fami-
lies protested the lack of ceremonies at Dover, which shows that the
assertions of government concern over the families' privacy inter-
ests and the families' obligation to travel to Dover may have been
false. 183 Second, following Desert Storm, the military held ceremo-
nies at Dover and allowed the press access. 184 The privacy interests
of the bereaved families and the feeling of compulsion to attend
the ceremonies are no different now than during Desert Storm.
The only difference appears to be that the government restricted
access during a war when media coverage of deaths could sway pub-
179. See CNN v. ABC, 518 F. Supp. 1238, 1245 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (recognizing
that television is only source of news for some individuals).
180. See id. Visual media provides a dimension not available in other forms of
coverage. See id. Television gives an immediate, comprehensive account of events
that are currently occurring. See id.
181. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 832 (1974). For a further discussion
of Pell and this policy, see supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
182. See id.
183. See Patrick J. Sloyan, The War You Won't See; Why the Bush Administration
Plans to Restrict Coverage of Gulf Combat, WASH. PosT, Jan. 13, 1991, at C2 (stating
that families of dead crew members protested when no ceremonies were held at
Dover following the crash of a cargo jet during Desert Shield).
184. See Greenfield, supra note 22, at A21 (describing televised ceremony at
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lic opinion against military involvement, but permitted access at a
time when governmental decisions did not result in deaths. 185
Furthermore, the D.C. Circuit failed to address JB Pictures'
free speech argument and therefore arbitrarily dismissed JB Pic-
tures' contention that the Department of Defense restriction cre-
ated a biased viewpoint.1 86  The D.C. Circuit should have
recognized coverage of the deceased soldiers as speech.187 Restric-
tions on speech require an analysis of the forum type where the
expressive activity occurred. 188 While Dover Air Force Base was
probably not a traditional public forum,189 it was a designated pub-
lic forum because the government opened Dover for the express
purpose of allowing the public and media to view supplies and per-
sonnel being shipped off to the Persian Gulf.190 Therefore, if the
D.C. Circuit had properly analyzed JB Pictures' claim as one per-
taining to free speech it would have applied strict scrutiny to the
Department of Defense restriction. 91 While the two interests ex-
pressed by the government, protecting the deceased family's pri-
185. See MatthewJ.Jacobs, Assessing the Constitutionality of Press Restrictions in the
Persian Gulf War, 44 STAN. L. REv. 675, 724-25 (1992) (suggesting that military for-
mulated strategy that resulted in manipulation of media coverage following Viet-
nam War).
186. SeeJB Pictures v. Department of Defense, 21 Media L. Rep. 1564 (D.C.
1993) (stating plaintiffs' claim as "right[ ] to know, to gather, report, and publish
news, and to speak about the effects of the war").
187. See CNN v. ABC, 518 F. Supp. 1238, 1245 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (describing
television broadcasting as unique form of speech because of live, comprehensive
dimension it provides).
188. For a discussion of forum classification and content-based regulations,
see supra notes 105-33 and accompanying text.
189. See Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (stating that traditional pub-
lic forums include sidewalks, streets and parks). Dover would probably not consti-
tute a traditional public forum even under Justice Kennedy's liberal analysis of
traditional public forums. See International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc.
v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 698 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring). For a discussion of
Kennedy's analysis of what constitutes a public forum, see supra note 106. An air
force base is physically similar to other traditional public forums, since air force
bases are comprised of sidewalks and streets. However, the government has not
acquiesced substantially in permitting access to Dover. Furthermore, allowing sig-
nificant expressive activity at Dover would likely interfere with the government's
interests of training airmen and preserving national security.
190. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (holding that designated
public forum was formed when state university opened its facilities to student orga-
nizations). For a discussion of Widmar, see supra notes 116-19 and accompanying
text.
191. See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 269-70 (holding content-based restrictions on
speech in designated public forums are subject to strict scrutiny); Perry Educ. Ass'n
v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45-46 (citing Widmar). The Department
of Defense restriction in JB Pictures is a content-based restriction because it pre-
vents the media from displaying an entire subject matter, the deceased soldiers.
The First Amendment precludes governmental restriction of expression based on
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vacy and reducing a burden on the deceased's family, were deemed
sufficient to overcome a balancing test they would likely fail strict
scrutiny because these interests are not compelling in light of the
regulations' effect of denying the public information about the
war.192
VI. IMPACT
If the decision by the D.C. Circuit Court in JB Pictures stands, it
may merely mean that the media will not be able to cover the re-
turn of war dead unless the consent of the families is first obtained.
The government will retain the ability to protect the bereaved fami-
lies' privacy interests. The media will have to find alternative ways
to increase public awareness of war casualties and other negative
aspects of war. Without this perspective reaching the public, the
public's viewpoint will truly be one-sided resulting in a false sense of
security.
The Department of Defense's restriction could be viewed as
part of a continuing desire to diminish the media's ability to cover
war and war related activities.193 As the government slowly chips
away at media coverage during wars, the public becomes increas-
ingly ignorant. 194 Suppressing the realities of war allows the gov-
ernment to maintain unobstructed decision making power. Unless
the courts or legislature review, and when appropriate, nullify De-
partment of Defense restrictions on the media, the democratic na-
ture of the United States will suffer.
its message or subject matter. See Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92,
95 (1972).
Although the D.C. Circuit failed to address content-based discrimination, it
did appropriately conclude that the Department of Defense policy was not view-
point discriminatory since all members of the media were subject to it equally. See
Sherrill v. Knight, 569 F.2d 124 (D.C. Cir. 1977). For a discussion of viewpoint
discrimination, see supra notes 129-33 and accompanying text.
192. See Stone, supra note 34, at 198-99. A regulation that "prevents the com-
munication of a particular idea, viewpoint, or item of information violates the First
Amendment except, perhaps, in the most extraordinary of circumstances." Id. at
198.
193. SeeJohn E. Smith, From the Front Lines to the Front Page: Media Access to War
in the Persian Gulf and Beyond, 26 COLUM.J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 291 (1993) (discussing
trend toward restricting media from war zone and war related events).
194. The government has recently attempted to increase restrictions on the
press in areas beside military events. See Gerald M. Carbone, ACI Wants to Limit
Media Interviews the ACLU Condemns the Proposed Policy as "oppressive. " PROVIDENCEJ.-
BULL., June 20, 1996, at BI (describing state policy that requires reporters to first
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The Supreme Court could decide to hear this case to clarify its
position on the First Amendment right of access or to apply con-
tent-based analysis to the restriction. If the Court decides to over-
rule JB Pictures the media would regain access to Dover's war dead,
an area of coverage that it probably took for granted prior to the
military restriction. Alternatively, the Court might decide to affirm
the decision providing further light on the constitutional limits of a
free press. Either way, the struggle over a right of access between
the press and the government will continue.
Scott A. MacNair
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